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Why did Poland not join the Eurozone despite being integrated economically and dependent on 
investments and trade with existing Eurozone countries? Th e reluctance of its government seems 
puzzling taking into consideration Polish economic exposure to Eurozone countries as well as its 
commitment to switch to the euro stemming from EU treaties. Th e Polish governmental position 
on Eurozone accession demonstrates that monetary integration is not only an economic and legal 
issue, but it also results from political decisions of individual governments. Th is paper argues that 
a complementary understanding of the position of the Polish government on Eurozone accession 
is possible by looking at domestic ideas and interests. For this aim, the societal approach to gov-
ernmental preference formation is employed. It focuses on the infl uence of domestic ideas (val-
ue-based collective expectations of voters) and interests (cost-benefi t calculations of lobby groups) 
on governmental positions. In applying the societal approach, this paper has two goals: fi rst, to 
show that the Polish governments’ reluctance to join the Eurozone stems from domestic societal 
pressures (value-based ideas and material interests) and, second, to specify the conditions for ei-
ther ideas’ or interests’ individual bearing on the government’s preference. 
Keywords: Poland, domestic politics, societal approach, Eurozone accession
Introduction
Poland belongs to the former Warsaw Pact countries that, aft er the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, oriented themselves towards Western institutions and started the transition to 
a  market economy. Poland’s government managed to implement rapid reforms, which 
helped to achieve a largely successful structural adjustment (Riedel 2015, p. 194; Beblavy 
2007). In 2004, Poland joined the European Union (EU). Accession to the EU, however, 
does not conclude the process of Poland’s European integration. Th e currency union — the 
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last stage of the European Monetary Union (EMU) — is another step which it is obliged to 
take according to EU treaties. Th e adoption of the single currency — the euro — is part of 
the requirement that all countries1 are committed to fulfi l when they become EU mem-
bers. However, aft er an initial inclination to join the Eurozone, the Polish government has 
refused to do this and indefi nitely postponed its accession (Johnson 2008, p. 827).
Th is paper seeks to bring light to the reasons for delaying monetary integration by this 
country under scrutiny. Th e paper is set out in four steps. First, the empirical puzzle and 
the research question are presented. Second, the theoretical framework, the hypotheses 
and the operationalisation will be introduced. Th ird, the case study dealing with the anal-
ysis of the variables shaping the governmental preference on Eurozone accession will be 
conducted. Fourth, empirical fi ndings are aggregated and the viability of the proposed 
hypotheses is assessed.
Th e empirical puzzle
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Poland is obliged 
to join the Eurozone and adopt the euro as its offi  cial currency as soon as it meets the 
Maastricht (convergence) criteria2 (EC 2018). Although Poland has demonstrated its abil-
ity to comply with basic economic requirements — price stability, long-term interest rates, 
and the government’s fi nancial position (budget defi cit percent of GDP, debt-to-GDP ra-
tio) — stipulated by the Maastricht criteria (see Table 1), it continually postpones the Eu-
rozone accession (ECB 2016, p. 111). Reports from the European Commission (EC 2016, 
p. 88) and the European Central Bank (ECB 2016, p. 186) conclude that laws in Poland do 
not comply with the requirements for Eurozone accession.






























Poland -0.5% 2.6% 51.3% No -7.5% 2.9% No
Source: ECB (2016)
Th us, despite the legal obligation to join the Eurozone (institutionalist argument), key 
steps to initiate the accession, such as the harmonization of the legal framework with the 
Eurozone standards or the submission to the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), 
remain under sovereign control of the country (IMF 2015, p. 4). Considering all the ad-
1 Denmark and the United Kingdom negotiated opt-out arrangements.
2 The Maastricht criteria (convergence criteria) are a set of macroeconomic indicators which 
measure price stability, to show infl ation is controlled; soundness and sustainability of public fi nances, 
through limits on government borrowing and national debt to avoid excessive defi cit; exchange-rate sta-
bility, through participation in the ERM II for at least two years without strong deviations from the ERM 
II central rate; long-term interest rates, to assess the durability of the convergence achieved by fulfi lling 
the other criteria (EC, 2018).
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vantages and disadvantages of monetary integration is thus ultimately an issue of national 
preference that might contradict the commitments stemming from EU treaties.
Moreover, as it will be shown below (see Case study), Poland is strongly dependent on 
exports to and foreign direct investments (FDI) from Eurozone countries. Th erefore, it 
seems reasonable for Poland to join the Eurozone and thereby avoid transactional costs 
that are an obstacle to substantial economic gains (a neofunctionalist argument). Instead, 
it continually postpones accession to the Eurozone. Refusal of the Polish government 
to join the Eurozone seems puzzling in light of Poland’s experience of transition from 
a planned economy to a market economy, accession to the EU and subsequent trade and 
investment exposure to the Eurozone countries. Based on the aforementioned puzzle, the 
following research question is formulated: Why did Poland not join the Eurozone despite 
being dependent on investments and trade with Eurozone countries? 
Th eoretical framework
In order to address the research question, this paper follows the societal approach to gov-
ernmental preference formation developed by Schirm (2011, 2013, 2016, 2018a, 2018b). It 
incorporates and develops further domestic politics approaches from Taking Preferences 
Seriously: A Liberal Th eory of International Relations (Moravcsik 1997), Varieties of Capi-
talism (Hall and Soskice 2001) and Historical Institutionalism (Fioretos 2011).
Th e core assumption of the societal approach is that governments strive to be re-elected 
and, therefore, are prone to be responsive and accountable to dominant societal infl u-
ences. Consequently, governmental positions express preferences originating from soci-
etal pressures prior to engaging in interstate negotiations (Schirm 2011, p. 50; 2013, p. 
690). Contrary to most other authors who employ domestic determinants separately (e.g. 
Frieden and Rogowski, 1996; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Moravcsik, 1997) Schirm in-
cludes three explanatory variables in his analysis: value-based ideas, material interests and 
regulatory institutions3.
Schirm (2011, p. 49) defi nes value-based ideas as “path-dependent and value-based col-
lective expectations” regarding appropriate governmental position on certain policies. 
Material interests in turn are defi ned as “material economic considerations of domestic 
actors which are shaped through the costs and benefi ts induced by market conditions 
and expected from policy initiatives” (Schirm 2011, p. 48). Material interests (hereinaft er 
“interests”) are expected to change promptly depending on the costs and benefi ts induced 
by changing global, regional and national economic policies (Schirm 2018b, p. 307). Val-
ue-based ideas (hereinaft er “ideas”), in turn, are considered to be more path-dependent 
and fundamental (Schirm 2018b, p. 308). Hence, they change less quickly than interests. 
Ideas and interests do not necessarily serve as exclusive driving forces, but are rather seen 
as analytically prior to other potential factors contributing to the formation of specifi c 
governmental preferences (Schirm 2018a, p. 64).
3 The regulatory institutions will not be considered in this paper, since material interests and val-
ue-based ideas seem better suited to explain the formation of governmental preference towards Eurozone 
accession in Poland. For the analysis of the role of value-based ideas, material interests and regulatory 
institutions in shaping governmental preference formation, see Schirm, 2016. 
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Although monetary policy has long been considered technocratic (that is to say a policy 
in which the ordinary citizens are disinterested), this has changed with the foundation 
of the Eurozone and subsequent outbreak of its crisis in 2009. Th is is because the conse-
quences of decisions on its management have become much more visible and politicised 
(Copelovitch, Frieden and Walter, 2016, p. 22). Th e Eurozone crisis made the redistributive 
consequences of monetary integration visible. Th is resulted in the increased awareness of 
citizens about the interdependence of European economies and the role that supranation-
al institutions play in determining the future of national economies (Hobolt and Wratil, 
2015, p. 238). Th e issue of Eurozone accession, thusly, makes national governments face 
the challenge of resolving the dilemma between preserving national autonomy and dem-
ocratic accountability and guaranteeing fi nancial and economic stability (Rodrik, 2011).
Th e societal approach is chosen to explain the Polish governmental position regarding 
the accession to the Eurozone because the question of monetary integration aff ects both 
material interests and value-based ideas. In this paper, interests are defi ned as economic 
considerations of industries dependent on investments and trade with Eurozone coun-
tries.
Ideas, in turn, are defi ned as value-based collective expectations regarding the appro-
priate governmental policy on transferring national authorities abroad. It is claimed here 
that ideas, expressed by domestic electorate, and interests, expressed by domestic business 
lobby groups, play a determinant role in shaping the preferences of the Polish government 
towards Eurozone accession. 
Most importantly, the societal approach specifi es the conditions for either ideas’ or in-
terests’ individual bearing on governmental preferences. Schirm (2018a, p. 65) argues that 
ideas will prevail in informing governmental preferences if the issue at stake raises fun-
damental concerns of voters on the appropriate role of the government when steering the 
economy and does not directly aff ect specifi c economic sectors’ cost-benefi t calculations. 
Interests in turn will dominate in shaping governmental positions if the issue at stake 
involves the cost-benefi t calculations of directly aff ected economic sectors. If both fun-
damental concerns of voters and cost-benefi t calculations of specifi c economic sector are 
raised by the issue at stake, both variables are expected to either reinforce or contradict 
each other in shaping governmental preferences (Schirm 2018a, p. 66). 
Hypotheses
Th is paper analyses Polish governmental preference on the issue of Eurozone accession 
as the dependent variable and domestic ideas and interests as the explanatory variables. 
If a  correlation between the governmental stance and respective ideas and interests is 
observed, then the societal approach seems plausible in explaining Polish governmental 
preference regarding Eurozone accession. Th us, this paper’s primary hypothesis is:
H1: If ideas and/or interests oppose Poland’s monetary integration, then the govern-
ment will postpone the accession to the Eurozone.
Moreover, as prescribed by the societal approach, conditions for the prevalence of either 
ideas or interests in shaping governmental preference should be contextualised. For this 
purpose, the following hypotheses are provided in order to be tested:
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H2: If the issue of Eurozone accession directly aff ects the cost-benefi t calculations of 
a  specifi c well-organised4 economic sector and does not raise fundamental concerns 
of voters on the appropriate governmental policy on transferring national authorities 
abroad, then interests will prevail over ideas in shaping the governmental position due 
to strong lobbying. 
H3: If the issue of Eurozone accession raises fundamental concerns of voters on the 
appropriate governmental policy on transferring national authorities abroad, and spe-
cifi c sectoral cost-benefi t calculations are aff ected diff usely, then ideas will prevail over 
interests in shaping the governmental position.
H4: If both the cost-benefi t calculations of a specifi c, directly aff ected, well-organised 
economic sector and fundamental concerns of voters on the appropriate governmental 
policy on transferring national authorities abroad are raised by the issue of Eurozone 
accession, then ideas will neutralise interests, given the opposing demands of the two 
explanatory variables.
Operationalization
Th e analysis of independent (domestic ideas and interests) and dependent (governmental 
preference) variables within this paper proceeds through the application of two primary 
qualitative methods: 1) the analysis of public opinion polls and 2) discourse analysis. Th e 
above methods are complemented by the analysis of the offi  cial trade and investments 
statistical data provided by the World Bank and the National Bank of Poland as well as 
secondary literature.
Th e analysis of public opinion polls conducted by the European Values Study (EVS) 
allows the value-based ideas to be distinguished. Th ese polls are not issue specifi c. Th e 
data provided by EVS identifi es the role voters ascribe to the government in transferring 
national authorities abroad. Th e ideas relevant to monetary integration could be found in 
the public attitudes on risks attached to the loss of monetary independence. Particularly, 
expectations of whether the government should compensate the potential costs attached 
to monetary integration or whether people have to bear such costs themselves will be 
compared. If voters consider the government responsible for compensating the potential 
losers of monetary integration, then they will be more willing to support transferring 
monetary independence abroad. If, on the other hand, people expect to bear the costs 
of monetary integration themselves, then they will favour the preservation of monetary 
policy within the jurisdiction of national government. Exemplary for such ideas are public 
opinion polls’ questions on whether the “state should make income equal” and the “gov-
ernment should tax the rich and subsidise the poor” (EVS, 2017). 
Th e examination of issue-specifi c public opinion polls, in turn, serves as a controlling 
instrument for the establishment of the presence or absence of fundamental societal con-
cerns on transferring national authorities abroad within the issue of Eurozone accession. 
Issue-specifi c opinion polls are provided by Eurobarometer (2012, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018). 
Public attitudes on whether the changeover to the euro will increase prices (Eurobarome-
4 Well-organised economic sector — a sector that possesses political (representation) and economic 
(generation of profi ts and jobs) strength (Schirm 2011, p. 50).
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ter 2014, p. 73), on favourability of EMU (Eurobarometer 2015, p. 26; Eurobarometer 2018, 
p. 30) and on the expectations related to the adoption of the euro (Eurobarometer 2017, p. 
24) will be analysed.
Th e method of discourse analysis is applied for two reasons. First, the analysis of busi-
ness discourse (i.e. of interest groups’ statements) allows relevant material interests to be 
determined. Second, the presence of the relevant societal ideas and interests within the 
process of the formation of governmental preferences on the issue of Eurozone accession 
is determined by the analysis of governmental discourse.
Interest group discourse is taken from statements and publications issued by the busi-
ness associations representing the industries to be aff ected by the issue of Eurozone ac-
cession. Concerning the procedure for the identifi cation of the industries aff ected by the 
issue of Eurozone accession, it is necessary to identify Poland’s export partners. Th is will 
determine the share of Eurozone countries as destinations for the Polish total exports and, 
thereby, will serve as an indicator on the motivation of industries involved in exports for 
lobbying on the issue of Eurozone accession.
In order to justify taking the export volume as an appropriate level of analysis of mate-
rial interests, it is necessary to consider the exports-to-GDP ratio. If exports account for 
a substantial share of GDP in Poland, then industries engaged in exports generate consid-
erable amount of profi ts and jobs and are able to infl uence governmental preferences. Th e 
empirical analysis of material interests, therefore, focuses on Poland’s export sector, which 
incorporates all industries that are dependent on investments and trade with Eurozone 
countries.
Governmental rhetoric, in turn, is discerned from the statements made by the repre-
sentatives of a ruling government (e.g. head of government, head of state, fi nance minis-
ter). Regardless of whether a government is considered Euro-enthusiastic or Euroscep-
tic, under the societal approach its representatives are interested to remain in offi  ce and, 
consequently, will express their positions in accordance with the principles acceptable 
to societal actors (Schirm 2013, p. 693). Th us, focusing on the statements from the repre-
sentatives of the ruling Polish government, the connection between the societal demands 
and governmental preference towards Eurozone accession is illustrated. Th e procedure 
indicating the presence of the independent variables within governmental preference for-
mation lies in setting a contextual correlation between ideational collective demands or 
claims expressed by aff ected interest groups and statements made by governmental rep-
resentatives.
Case study
Despite the offi  cial obligation to join the Eurozone at some point in time, the Polish gov-
ernment repeatedly delays the accession. Th ere is insuffi  cient voting in Polish parliament 
to approve constitutional changes that would put the European Central Bank in charge of 
monetary policy over the National Bank of Poland. 
Ideas
Poland represents an exceptional trend in terms of attitudes towards European integra-
tion. Poles tend to express support for the EU (CBOS 2014), but, at the same time, they 
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remain sceptical towards some lines of integration, namely towards the EMU (Euroba-
rometer 2015, p. 26).
Over 80 percent of Poles support its country being an EU member state (CBOS 2014). 
In addition, the majority of Poles have trust towards the EU as a project. Forty percent of 
Poles perceive the EU image to be positive, while only 10 percent perceive it as negative. 
A considerably higher proportion of Poles than Europeans on average thought that the EU 
is moving in the right direction (38 percent versus 22 percent, respectively) (Eurobarometer 
2012 pp. 41, 75, 77). Debomy (2018) claims that the support for accession to the EU among 
Poles was motivated by their expectations to gradually catch up with the standard of living 
enjoyed by Western Europeans, as well as the prospect of enjoying the EU’s fundamental 
rights and freedoms (e.g. freedom of movement and establishment). Yet, while the process 
of continued economic integration of Poland appeared to be successful for certain sectors, 
it clearly failed to lift  the standard of living of the whole population. Instead, the income 
disparities between those who participate in the export-oriented industries and those who 
are excluded or who have to bear the costs of economic integration arose (Bohle and Gre-
skovits 2006, pp. 20–21). Th e outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, in turn, resulted into the 
increased awareness of citizens about the interdependence of European economies and the 
role that supranational institutions play in determining the future of national economies 
(Hobolt and Wratil 2015, p. 238). Consequently, these developments made Poles more hes-
itant towards the transfer of their government’s monetary authority abroad.
Figure 1. Do you think the introduction of the euro would have positive or negative consequences for 
our country? 
Source: Eurobarometer (2017, p. 24)
Th e results of the public opinion polls by EVS (2017) confi rm that Poles do not seem to 
permit their government a responsibility for compensating the potential losers of mon-
etary integration. It means that they expect to bear the potential costs of monetary inte-
gration themselves. Th us, less than half of Poles (45 percent) attach the governmental task 
of taxing the rich and subsidizing the poor to the important characteristics of democracy 
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(EVS 2017, Q39A). In turn, the majority of Poles (57 percent) do not consider the govern-
ment’s responsibility to make people’s incomes equal to be an important characteristic of 
democracy (EVS 2017, Q39G). Th erefore, Poles seem to favour the preservation of mone-
tary policy within the jurisdiction of their national government.
Th e examination of opinion polls specifi c to the issue of Eurozone accession confi rms 
that with the eruption of the Eurozone crisis, Poles became less likely to think that the in-
troduction of the euro would have positive consequences for their country (see Figure 1).
A vast majority of Poles (76 percent) believed that the introduction of the euro would 
increase prices (Eurobarometer 2014, p. 73) and only less than a third of Poles supported 
the accession to the Eurozone (Eurobarometer 2015, p. 26). Only one out of ten Poles ex-
pressed readiness to join the Eurozone as soon as possible while half of respondents would 
prefer the accession to be as late as possible, or never (Eurobarometer 2018, p. 30). It is 
remarkable that only 19 percent of Poles were aware that their country was committed to 
Eurozone accession (Eurobarometer, 2014, p. 7).
Interests 
Poland’s goods exports-to-GDP ratio indicates that its economy is export oriented (World 
Bank 2019a). It means that the sectors engaged in exports generate a considerable amount 
of profi ts and jobs and, following the analytical framework presented in this paper, are 
able to infl uence governmental preferences formation. Th is can justify the taking of ex-
port volume as an appropriate level of examination of material interests expected to be 
aff ected by the issue of Eurozone accession. 
Th e identifi cation of Poland’s export partners, in turn, helps determine the share of 
Eurozone countries as destinations for Poland’s total export of goods and serves as an 
indicator for the motivations to lobby for accession to the Eurozone by industries involved 
in exports. Table 2 illustrates that Germany is Poland’s most important export partner, 
which between 2007 and 2017 accounted for over a quarter of its total export on average. 
France, Italy and the Netherlands are other important destinations for Polish exports rep-
resenting the Eurozone. Hence, over half (56 percent on average) of Poland’s total export 
of goods accounts for Eurozone countries (see Table 2).
Th e variety of Polish exports (i.e. the number of diff erent brands) to the Eurozone is as 
high as that of the Czech Republic and substantially exceeds a respective variety of other 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) (Belka 2013, p. 20). Moreover, Poland 
is deeply integrated into the Eurozone’s supply chains and production networks, and it 
annually increases its share (Rozworski, 2015). Due to the Polish-German cooperation, 
vehicles and vehicle parts remain among Poland’s leading export commodities — of which 
a substantial share is sold under the German brands, i.e. “up to 40 percent of Poland’s ex-
ports to Germany end up as German exports to the rest of the world” (Reszczynski 2014, 
p. 28). In addition, 83 percent of the stock of Poland’s inward FDI accounts for the Euro-
zone with Dutch, German, Luxemburgish and French fi rms leading inward investment 
activity (Belka 2013, p. 24; Bank of Poland, 2014). Th e infl ow of foreign capital has made 
Poland’s exports more innovative and technologically advanced. Th is has forced Poland 
to double its export of high-tech production (MFA of Poland 2014, pp. 82–83).
Th e Polish export sector would substantially benefi t from abandoning transaction costs 
which possess obstacles to substantial economic gains. Th erefore, it is strongly interest-
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ed in the accession of Poland to the Eurozone, as confi rmed by the survey of 230 Polish 
companies engaged in the exports of goods and services. Fift y-two percent of companies 
responded that the adoption of the euro in Poland would increase their competitiveness 
(Gorynia, et al. 2012, p. 27).
Table 2. Poland’s top Export Partner Share (in %)
Partner Name 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EU 78.8 77.9 79.6 78.9 77.7 75.2 74.7 76.6 78.8 78.9 79.0
Eurozone 57.3 56.5 58.4 57.3 56.0 53.7 52.9 54.7 56.1 56.0 56.5
Germany 25.9 25.1 26.1 26.0 26.0 24.9 25.0 25.9 26.9 27.0 27.2
United Kingdom 5.9 5.8 6.4 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.5 6.4 6.8 6.6 6.4
Czech Republic 5.5 5.7 5.9 5.9 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.5 6.3
France 6.1 6.2 7.0 6.8 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.6
Italy 6.6 6.0 6.8 6.0 5.4 4.9 4.3 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.9
Russian Feder-
ation
4.6 5.2 3.7 4.2 4.5 5.5 5.3 4.4 2.9 2.9 3.1
Netherlands 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.3
Sweden 3.2 3.2 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.7
Hungary 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6
Ukraine 4.0 3.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.8 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.2
Source: World Bank (2019b)
In turn, leaders of the Polish business community appealed to Prime Minister Mateusz 
Morawiecki in an open letter, requesting to start preparations for Poland’s Eurozone ac-
cession:
With more than 50% share of the countries of the single currency in Polish exports, we 
are one highly integrated and synchronised economy. And that means that the policy 
of the European Central Bank will be adapted to the needs of our country. [...] At our 
transit geographical location, we have no choice. [...] We believe that it is necessary to 
set up a permanent council that will identify the necessary changes in the legal and 
fi nancial system, help select the right moment to enter the ERM II mechanism and 
profi table zloty exchange rate for the Polish economy, and initiate a social information 
campaign that will provide the public with objective data on the common currency and 
dispel myths about euro adoption. (Rzeczpospolita, 2018)
Th e Confederation of Polish Employers, Lewiatan, the most infl uential business or-
ganisation in Poland (associating 3,900 companies that employ 835,000 workers), stated 
that the elimination of currency exchange operations aft er Poland’s accession to the Eu-
rozone would remove foreign exchange risks and substantially cut down business expens-
es, which would make Poland’s economy more competitive. Another signifi cant benefi t 
of Poland’s Eurozone integration would be the removal of preconditions for a currency 
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crisis, said Lewiatan (2016). Th is benefi t is of an additional importance for Poland, be-
cause the weakening of the Polish zloty and its volatility substantially increases the risks 
involved in business activities. Lewiatan therefore stressed the necessity for parliament to 
ratify the amendments to the constitution needed for Poland’s accession to the Eurozone. 
“If there is no political will to bring Poland into the Eurozone this will be synonymous 
with intentionally exposing the Polish economy to a very high risk,” said Lewiatan repre-
sentatives in a statement (Warsaw voice, 2008).
To sum up, the strong trade connectedness of Poland with Eurozone countries and FDI 
stock and infl ows into Poland from Eurozone countries provided Poland’s export sector 
with strong incentives for lobbying in favour of Poland’s accession to the Eurozone. Th is is 
because accession to the Eurozone would remove foreign exchange risks and substantially 
increase the competitiveness of export-involved industries.
Governmental preference
Th ere have been two mainstream political parties in Poland since its accession to the EU: 
Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO). Aft er it won the parliamentary elections 
of 2007 and its leader, Donald Tusk, took over the prime ministerial offi  ce, PO declared 
that Poland would head into Eurozone integration. Tusk insisted on both the political and 
economic urgency for Poland to adopt the euro and announced for the year 2012 to be-
come the target date for Poland’s accession to the Eurozone (Dandashly and Verdun, 2010, 
p. 21). “It should be emphasised that the single currency is now a key part of European 
integration. Staying outside the common currency, as a strategy, would be dangerous for 
Poland,” stated Tusk (Radio Poland, 2013). Tusk’s government ambitions regarding Po-
land’s early Eurozone accession were severely criticised by PiS, the opposition. PiS leader 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski accused Polish authorities of “selling the country’s sovereignty [...] for 
the sake of private interests” (IHS Global Insight, 2011).
Prime Minister Tusk initiated public discussion but was not successful in convincing 
voters in the rationality behind introducing the euro into Poland. Th erefore, he gave up 
his ambitious plans for Poland’s accession to the Eurozone in 2012 and made no eff ort to 
mention any probable date for the adoption of the euro (Th e Wall Street Journal, 2014). 
“Poland should not join the Eurozone if signifi cant doubts exist as to how this will aff ect 
the lives of every Pole,” stated Tusk (Xinhua, 2010). “Th e decision on Poland’s entry to the 
Eurozone will be made only when it will be certain that taking on the euro will not lead 
to any losses for Poles,” added Tusk (Intellinews, 2013). 
In an attempt to reverse negative opinions on Eurozone accession, the Cabinet of Tusk 
resorted to promoting the potential benefi ts of integration into the Eurozone. However, as 
opinion polls proved, this eff ort did not contribute to the rise of enthusiasm for the euro 
adoption among Poles. On the contrary, such attempts led to the rise in popularity of 
PO’s major political rival — PiS, known for its nationalist orientation and leaning towards 
Euroscepticism (Heinisch and Landsberger, 2012, p. 15). PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski 
insisted on the necessity to increase the share of the Polish state and Polish investors in 
core economic sectors and advocated the preservation of the zloty in the capacity of Po-
land’s national currency (Tokarski and Wiklund, 2013). He also called the euro a “Ger-
man-dominated instrument of economic oppression” (Cienski, 2018). “Th e euro is com-
pletely contrary to our interests,” Kaczynski said (Radio Poland, 2011) in his anti-euro 
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adoption public speech, who also claimed that Eurozone integration would undermine 
Poland’s sovereignty  In addition, Kaczynski opposed the fi scal compact treaty, which 
provides the EU with more competences towards the control of national budgets (Stratfor, 
2013). In short, taking the approach to defend Polish monetary independence allowed PiS 
win support by a signifi cant quantity of voters (Th e Guardian, 2015; Th e Polish Politics 
Blog, 2015).
Aft er coming to power, Kaczynski stated: “Th e Eurozone brings benefi ts to the strong-
est countries in the EU, at the expense of economically weaker EU member states”. He 
suggested that Poland’s accession to the Eurozone would cause high infl ation and that his 
country’s monetary integration is possible only “when earnings in Poland would be com-
parable to earnings in ‘old’ EU member states” (Polish News Bulletin 2019). 
In the 2015 parliamentary election manifesto, Beata Szydlo, the Law and Justice can-
didate for Prime Minister, stated: “I can declare today that if Law and Justice wins the 
elections and forms the next government, one of my fi rst decisions would be to abol-
ish the government’s plenipotentiary tasked with introducing the euro in Poland” (Open 
Europe, 2015). Subsequently, when she became Prime Minister, Szydlo said: “People feel 
more and more that the elites in Brussels are . . . no longer in touch with the problems that 
they should be concerned about — such as increasing employment and improving wages 
[...] Th is leads to crisis” (Financial Times, 2017). 
Th e issue of the euro adoption had also become central in the political debates ahead 
of the presidential elections in 2015. Th us, Andrzej Duda, the presidential candidate, con-
ducted his campaign with the slogan “Yes to Europe, No to the Euro”. Remarkably, put-
ting the euro issue at the centre of his presidential campaign allowed Duda to win the 
election (Bloomberg, 2015). Later on, Krzysztof Szczerski, Presidents Duda’s senior advis-
er, suggested a referendum on Eurozone accession to be held in Poland. He stated: “Th e 
decision on ceasing to mint one’s own currency must be [...] the nation’s decision” (Th e 
Telegraph, 2015). It is worth mentioning, however, that Poland is not legally required to 
hold a referendum on the issue of the Eurozone accession. 
Mateusz Morawiecki, who replaced Beata Szydlo on the post of prime minister, while 
addressing monetary integration, said: 
In today’s Europe, it is precisely the struggle of interests that plays a pivotal role and we 
can see exactly this struggle and want to use our national sovereignty and tradition as 
an advantage in the fi ght for our national interests (Morawiecki, 2017). 
He also criticised the European project of ever-closer integration. “I’m for a  Europe 
of nation states, [...] a United States of Europe won’t get anywhere because people won’t 
accept it,” stated Morawiecki (2017). To sum up, Polish authorities have shown demon-
stratively that they — in line with societal ideas — oppose Poland’s monetary integration.
Conclusion
Th is paper has argued that explaining the position of the Polish government towards Eu-
rozone accession requires an analysis of material considerations of industries dependent 
on investments and trade with the Eurozone countries, as well as ideational collective 
expectations regarding the appropriate governmental policy on transferring national au-
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thorities abroad. For this purpose, the societal approach to governmental preference for-
mation has been employed. It analyses the impact of domestic value-based ideas and ma-
terial interests on governmental positions in international relations and asks under which 
conditions would either ideas or interests prevail in shaping the governmental preference. 
Following the societal approach to governmental preference formation, the puzzle of why 
Poland did not join the Eurozone despite being dependent on investments and trade with 
Eurozone countries has been explained. Th e societal approach was chosen because neither 
institutionalist nor neofunctionalist arguments suffi  ce to solve the above puzzle.   
As shown in this research, Poland’s strong dependence on exports to and foreign direct 
investments from Eurozone countries provide its export sector with a strong motivation 
for lobbying with the aim to positively infl uence governmental preference in favour of 
Eurozone accession. In turn, Polish voters do not seem to ascribe their government a re-
sponsibility for compensating the potential losers of monetary integration. It means that 
they expect to bear the costs of potential Eurozone accession themselves. Th erefore, Poles 
favour the preservation of monetary policy within the jurisdiction of their national gov-
ernment. Hence, they oppose Eurozone accession.
It was demonstrated that the issue of Eurozone accession in Poland raises both the 
cost-benefi t calculations of the export sector and fundamental concerns of voters on the 
appropriate governmental policy on transferring national authorities abroad. Following 
societal ideas, the Polish government refused to pursue monetary integration and subse-
quent Eurozone accession. Th us, ideational societal expectations have neutralised material 
interest groups’ considerations in bearing on the Polish governmental preference towards 
Eurozone accession. Th ese points support the fi rst (H1) and the fourth (H4) hypotheses of 
this study and explain why Poland did not join the Eurozone.
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